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CONFLICT ALERT SYSTEMS AND CONFLICT PREVENTION
ABSTRACT
This paper addresses issues surrounding the use of conflict alert systems to support conflict
prevention activities.  The paper first gives the reader an understanding of the role and
capabilities of conflict alert systems.  The paper then describes the use of such systems within
institutions.  With that background the paper then discusses issues which must be resolved
regarding both the technical and organizational aspects of conflict alert systems to enable them
to support conflict prevention by national, regional, and global security organizations. 
2CONFLICT ALERT SYSTEMS AND CONFLICT PREVENTION
INTRODUCTION
The idea of conflict early warning systems has re-emerged in recent years with more attention
and support from academics and practitioners dealing with conflicts than earlier efforts.1  The
realization that early intervention may have prevented disasters such as Rwanda or Somalia has
encouraged governments, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations to
get an early warning that a violent conflict, with its attendant humanitarian relief demands, is
about to erupt.  Organizations with responsibilities for humanitarian relief hope to plan more
effective operations to provide food and other necessities to persons displaced by the violence. 
Other organizations that focus on diplomatic initiatives to end conflicts hope to pre-empt the
violence by implementing conflict prevention measures such as preventive diplomacy or
preventive peacekeeping.2
Two developments have spurred this renewed interest in conflict early warning and computer
systems to provide this warning.  The first is the that the number of violent conflicts and--
especially--the cost of trying to police the situations or provide relief has mushroomed in
recent years.  Organizations such as the United Nations increasingly confront donor fatigue and
realize that something different must be done.  Of the three alternatives: Do an inadequate job
because of insufficient funds, acquire the funds through a revenue source such as a tax on
international airline flights,3 or try to prevent conflicts from becoming violent (and costly) by
3initiating negotiations and addressing the causes of the discontent, the third looks increasingly
attractive because the first appears grim and inhumane and the second is certain to meet strong
resistance.
The second development is the permeation of computers into so many aspects of
organizational operations.  The idea of using computers for conflict early warning is no longer
far-fetched.  Twenty years ago very few of us had direct interaction with computers.  To the
extent we knew anything about computers, we associated them with “number crunching.” 
Now, primarily because of word processors, we recognize that computers can work with texts
as well, and news that would be used for early warning is in large part textual information. 
Moreover, the emergence of widespread computer networking and on-line information sources,
which we most often encounter through email and network “browsers,” makes us recognize
that information from around the world can quite easily be gathered into computers for
analysis.  Since computers have found so many uses and do things we never dreamed of, the
idea that they could contribute to conflict early warning, while exotic, is no longer something
solely in the realm of science fiction.
Some believe that using an early warning system makes little sense “because we already know
where the conflicts are likely to happen.”  That is in part true.  In many cases a country expert
(or perhaps better, a nongovernmental organization worker in the country) can with reasonable
accuracy assess the probability of a violent conflict emerging in the next 3 to 12 months. 
However, there are four reasons why an early warning system is needed.
4First, an alert from an individual regarding an upcoming conflict has little “weight” unless the
individual has a track record for such forecasts.  Someone would ask, in effect, “Has the
individual correctly discerned future conflicts in the country before, or, for that matter, in other
countries?”  In most cases the answer would be ‘no,’ and as a result, few organizations would
be willing to initiate action upon such a warning.
Second, individuals in conflict management or humanitarian relief organizations tend to focus
on existing conflicts or relief efforts.  They seldom have time to closely follow developments
in other places.  Third, individuals in those organizations whose job it is to follow
developments usually have several countries to monitor.  It is difficult if not impossible for
those individuals to sufficiently closely monitor each country so that they could issue an alert a
number of months in advance of a conflict.
Finally, the real value of an early warning system appears when it alerts us to impending
conflicts that are not obvious.  It is possible that an institutionalized early warning system
could find harbingers of conflicts that do not attract the attention of experts or people living in
the country.
A conflict early warning system exists at two different levels.  The first consists of a conflict
alert system (CAS), computer equipment, databases, and programs than scan news feeds and
other texts to find patterns in events or trends that indicate a violent conflict will erupt at some
location in the world in the next 3-12 months.4  The second level consists of organizational
5structures and procedures that enable the CAS to operate properly and that ensure an alert and
supporting information reach those who need it, usually decision makers within the
organization.  The second level can exist without the first, but for the reasons given above, it is
probably necessary to have both for conflict early warning to become a reality.  The difference
between these two levels is often ignored or confused.  That is unfortunate because the work
involved in making each level function properly differs significantly, and focusing on one or
the other will probably result in a suboptimal if not ineffective conflict early warning system.
Neither level of a conflict early warning system exists in full at this time.  The rest of this paper
describes what needs to be done to develop a conflict alert system and what needs to be
considered in order to make effective use of a CAS in an organization so that conflict early
warning becomes an accepted and even expected activity.  It is hoped that this paper will
stimulate thinking and discussion of what should be done when the technical capability to
receive conflict alerts, namely, a functioning conflict alert system becomes available.
THE FUNCTIONS OF A CONFLICT ALERT SYSTEM
A conflict alert system has three functions directly relevant to an organization’s interest in
conflict early warning.  The first, obviously, is to generate conflict alerts sufficiently far in
advance of the conflict outbreak to help the organization initiate actions to prevent the conflict
or deal with its consequences.  While a necessary function for a CAS to be useful, it is not
sufficient. 
6The second function is to give the analyst and thus the organization a probability or confidence
assessment of the alert.  If a CAS can when generating an alert “say” something to the effect
that “When we have seen this situation in the past, 88% of the time a conflict has erupted
within 12 months,” the likelihood that decision makers will act on the alert is much higher than
if the probability is 20% or if there is no probability assessment. This function is crucial.  It
provides an impetus for action by creating a “fact” that a decision maker ignores at her or his
peril.  If no action is taken in the face of a high probability assessment, the decision maker is
open to charges of dereliction of duty.
The third function, while not strictly necessary but probably desirable, is to provide
information about the situation and the alert such as what type of conflict is likely to erupt and
what are the current and past circumstances in the area.  This function is especially relevant
when one considers the second, organizational level of a conflict early warning system.  As an
alert is funneled to appropriate, probably high-level, decision makers such as the UN
Secretary-General or the OSCE Committee of Senior Officials or the director of an
organization such as CARE, an early warning system that failed to provide the information that
can help them make their decisions will not be deemed useful and will almost certainly be
ignored.
Precisely what a conflict alert system is may not be familiar to the reader.  To fully understand
the nature of a CAS and what it can do, let us start at the level of generating an alert.  
7USING A CONFLICT ALERT SYSTEM IN SUPPORT OF CONFLICT PREVENTION
A conflict early warning alert will begin at the level of an analyst, within some organization,
whose job it is to provide conflict alerts.  The following example illustrates how such an
analyst may use an CAS as part of his or her job.
The analyst arrives at his or her office in the morning, turns on the computer, and activates the
CAS program.  The first screen that appears is a map.  (It may be a world map, but if there are
multiple conflict alert specialists, the first map may instead be the region of that individual’s
specialization.)  Highlighted on the map are two adjacent countries flashing red.  Moreover, the
two countries are flashing synchronously, which means that the problem concerns both of
them.  The analyst investigates this alert by moving the computer’s “mouse" so that a pointer
on the screen correspondingly moves to the pair of countries.  The pair of countries is selected
for investigation when the analyst presses a button on the mouse when the pointer is on either
of the countries.
When that is done, a map of the two countries replaces the world (or regional) map.  On the
new map both country capitals and the border zone are flashing red.  The analyst "clicks" the
mouse on one of the capitals.  A "window" (an area on the screen) opens with news reports and
government statements about the situation at the border.  This window contains information
about or from the capital that contributed to the system generating an alert.  After examining
the news from both capitals, the analyst then clicks on the border zone.  A more detailed map
8of that region replaces the two-country map.  Certain pieces of information such as key
topographical features and territory held by different organizations are depicted on the map. 
Another window appears that contains recent reports from the border region.
Also on the screen are a number of icons, which are symbols that represent different types of
information.  For example, an icon in the shape of an army tank could be used to represent
military weaponry information.  Other examples could be a human body to represent
demographic statistics, a book to represent historical information, and a graph to represent
economic data.  The information represented by these icons is background information.  As
before, by moving the screen pointer (with the mouse) to the desired icon and pressing the
mouse button, a window appears on the screen which enables the user to view the chosen type
of information in that window in tabular, graphical, or textual form, whichever is appropriate. 
In this way the analyst can quickly acquire background information that will help the analyst
evaluate the early warning alert.  If desired, the user can print information by "dragging" it
with the mouse to an icon for a printer.  
Numerous embellishments to this basic scheme would undoubtedly appear in practice.  These
include things color coding to indicate the urgency of the early warning and a symbol adjacent
to the flashing unit to indicate the nature of the early warning (conflict, food shortage, refugee
flow, etc.).
After examining the background information on the two countries, and especially, the current
9event information that caused the computer system to generate an alert, the analyst decides
whether the situation merits further investigation or whether it is a false alarm.  If a false alarm,
the analyst may either ignore the alert or, preferably, indicate to the computer system that it, in
the analyst’s judgment, made an incorrect evaluation and that it was putting too much weight
on a particular factor or event.
If the analyst believes that the alert should be taken seriously, a different sequence of events
begins.  If the analyst needs more information, she or he will obtain it and re-evaluate the alert. 
If the alert still appears real, the analyst will bring the alert to the attention of a higher-level
official.  If such an individual, perhaps the head of a conflict early warning office, deems the
alert meritorious, the individual notifies even higher-level decision makers, perhaps even the
head of the organization.  That decision maker could, after consultations, initiate an action such
as assign a peacemaking envoy, who hopefully can mediate a settlement.
The sequence of steps described above, is, to be sure, much simplified from what would
actually happen, but it delineates the essence of how an alert from a computerized system
might set in motion actions to prevent a conflict.
One problem with conflict early warning as it is now done is that alerts are sent up the chain of
command, but no action is taken.  This is not--or should not be--surprizing.   The attention of
most high-level governmental decision makers swings from one crisis to the next.  Taking
action to resolve a conflict entails costs be they financial, scarce personnel time, or even lives. 
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Expending resources to deal with “someone else’s problem” or affairs, as a large portion of
most countries’ populations perceive it, is seldom popular unless a case can be made that the
conflict directly and unambiguously affects domestic interests.  Given those constraints, a
decision maker is naturally going to be skeptical that it is worthwhile to take preventive action
in a situation that may or may not become a violent conflict.  The decision maker cannot help
but ask, “What is the likelihood that a conflict will indeed occur?  What if I make the decision
to initiate conflict prevention activities, and it becomes a violent conflict anyway?  What if I
make the decision to intervene but do not get credit if the intervention succeeds?”  No decision
maker looks at the last two questions as career-enhancing outcomes.
A CAS can help deal with this problem of decision maker inaction even when preventive
intervention may help.  The analyst has a better chance of convincing a higher-level official
that the alert merits action if the analyst can show the official the information that generated the
alert so that the official can evaluate it him or herself.  As stated earlier, one piece of
information that would be particularly useful would be a probability assessment of the
likelihood of a future conflict given a comparison with similar situations in the past.  For this
reason a conflict alert system should be designed and empirically grounded to provide that
information.  A later section expands upon this point.
It is worth noting that the background information used as part of a CAS can also be used to
support other conflict prevention or humanitarian relief activities initiated by an organization’s
leadership.  For instance, information, if available, about troop strengths is certainly of interest
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to a mediator that may be sent into a pre-conflict situation.  The availability of this information
can in a small way enhance the effectiveness of an intervention, such as a mediator, and thus
improve the odds that the intervention will succeed.  A CAS will not resolve the high-level
political issues surrounding the decision by countries and conflict management organizations to
intervene, but it can help in the decision-making process.
KEY ELEMENTS OF A CONFLICT ALERT SYSTEM
Let us now examine the core components of a conflict alert system.  The interaction described
above emphasizes an interface that is timely and user-friendly so that information can be
relayed quickly and easily.  However, there is much more that lies behind the computer
interface, and it is with these components that several questions must be answered and
problems solved.
To do the functions described above, the CAS must include a mechanism by which large
amounts of raw data, current news and other publications, are gleaned for indications of
potential conflicts.  This involves two main steps.  First, information sources must be tapped. 
A CAS must access a variety of sources in terms of both type and origin.  These include
television and radio broadcasts, wire services news feeds, newspapers, journals, books, and
statistical compilations.  The information should not be restricted to materials generated by
North American or European organizations or news media.
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To monitor information from a variety of sources, including local ones, essentially worldwide
means that an enormous volume of information must be handled.  Fortunately, advances in
using computers to monitor and process information that is transmitted in electronic form5 as
well as scanners and optical character recognition software to read printed materials into
computers makes handling that volume of information feasible for a small staff.
The second step is to glean warning signs from the incoming data.   Alternative approaches to
finding these signs are being explored.6  For many, this step reduces to the question of what are
the appropriate early warning indicators. They believe that if someone can tell them which
indicators, what types of information they should collect, the conflict early warning problem is
solved.  Moreover, some hope for a set of universal conflict indicators, a relatively small
number of indicators that can point to a future conflict in most if not all countries and to the
types of conficts that may occur in those countries.  Such a set is unlikely to exist, and gleaning
warning signs is a much more complicated problem than simply monitoring certain pieces of
information.
The first problem to overcome in order to glean early warning signs from news feeds and other
information sources is to properly identify the violent conflicts towards which indicators would
“point.”  Stated differently, we cannot determine the independent variables that “cause” a
change in the dependent variable unless we know what the dependent variable is, and “the
outbreak of war” or even “the outbreak of a violent conflict” does not suffice as a dependent
variable.  Both of them are too general.  One position to take on this issue is to focus on one
13
type of conflict and attempt to find appropriate indicators.  However, there is a problem with
this position.  If we put ourselves in the role of an analyst concerned about conflict early
warning, that individual would not want the conflict alert system to give an alert only for a
certain type of conflict such as an ethnic conflict between two groups; the arena of concern for
such an analyst is virtually any kind of violent conflict.  
King, Keohane, and Verba argue that finding the sources of phenomena such as armed conflict
benefits enormously from choosing cases that allow one to cover the full range of values of the
dependent variable.7  This dovetails with the analyst’s concern to support an alternative
position.  The variety in characteristics of the different types of violent conflicts within and
between countries almost certainly requires that we think in terms of finding different
combinations of indicators for different kinds of violent conflicts (although whether a limited
set of universal conflict indicators is possible is ultimately an empirical question.)
To properly establish the different kinds of conflicts, we need to create a taxonomy of violent
conflicts that classifies them according to theoretically important distinguishing characteristics
and groups them at higher levels of generality.  Existing typologies are not sufficient for this
purpose because they are not comprehensive.8  Another facet of this research project is
developing a taxonomy to get us past this problem.9
The second problem to overcome is the choice of early warning indicators.  At one level this is
easy.  Anyone interested in the conflict early warning problem can in short order develop a list
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of those indicators the individual deems important.  The hard part is convincing anyone that the
list consists of good predictors or at least better predictors than other individuals’ lists.  There
are two components to overcoming this hurdle, one theoretical and one empirical.  The
theoretical component is that the indicators should be supported by theoretical schools
pertaining to the causes of violent conflict.  We do not lack theoretical explanations.  The
difficulty lies in that none hold up consistently either empirically or logically.10  With respect to
conflict early warning there is another aspect to the problem that makes progress difficult. 
When one is in the role of an academic wrestling with theoretical arguments, one tends to
focus on one or a few indicators in order to tease out its/their role.11  On the other hand, when
one is in the role of a researcher attempting to develop a CAS, one does not want to be
restricted to indicators favored by a particular theoretical school because no theoretical
framework has demonstrated its superiority.  The resulting lists of indicators tend to be
extensive as the researcher attempts to be inclusive and incorporate a large portion if not all
causes of conflict.12  (As one can see, this is related to the specification of different types of
conflicts problem.)  Given the current state of our knowledge, a reasonable middle ground may
be to develop lists of indicators that span different theoretical schools but at the same time
consist of indicators that possess theoretical support rather than just seem plausible.13
The empirical component to determining the best list of indicators raises other problems.  One
will almost certainly need a large number of cases (conflicts) in order to find good early
warning indicators.  Getting this requires that one use conflicts from an extended time period. 
The post-World War II period is probably a minimum time frame within which to get enough
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examples of any particular type of conflict to find its harbingers.  Datasets including only those
conflicts from the past few years will likely be insufficient.
Even if or when one has one’s type or types of conflict carefully specified, has a theoretically-
informed list of indicators, and has a dataset containing a significant number of cases relevant
to the type or types of conflict, one still faces nontrivial obstacles in determining whether one
has indeed identified good, useable indicators.    For example, it may be that only particular
configurations of conditions (and thus only particular combinations of indicator values) serve
as the harbingers of future violent conflicts.14  If so, then identifying early warning indicators
becomes a pattern recognition problem that is not easily addressed with conventional statistical
regression techniques.  What is more, it is possible, perhaps even probable, that these
configurations are complicated, making it such that one cannot simply monitor a few indicators
and so to speak “eyeball” them.  If this is the case, statistical pattern recognition techniques
will need to be brought to bear on the collected data.
The panoply of problems discussed above refers only to the question of finding early warning
indicators or combinations of them.  There remain additional hurdles to overcome to
accomplish the second task of a CAS, gleaning warning signs from the incoming data.  They
pertain to the problem of how to translate knowledge about early warning signs into a real-time
(or nearly so) computer system monitoring the incoming information as described above.  The
first of these hurdles concerns the database that will lie at the core of an operating conflict alert
system.  In fact, a CAS is more than anything else a well-designed database with sophisticated
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procedures for scanning the data and extracting patterns that are believed or have been
demonstrated to be indicators of future problems.
CAS database development is not a trivial problem.  First, the design is complicated.  This
results from the facts that:
1. Data must be organized for a large number of entities (roughly 200 countries, perhaps
30 regional groupings, and hundreds of ethnic groups),
2. Many of these entities overlap with each other (for example, there are many ethnic
groups whose territory crosses national boundaries),
3. Many of these entities interact with each other, and
4. Information must be stored about these entities and their interaction over time.
Second, the database structure must be capable of evolving so that it corresponds to changing
circumstances such as the breakup or integration of states.  Few databases can do this with
ease.
Whereas the database is a condensation of information about the world deemed important to
identifying potential conflict, the heart of the CAS--and the second hurdle--consists of a
mechanism that searches through the database, identifies "significant" situations, and then
brings them to the attention of the analyst.  This mechanism must compare the current
situations of countries and regions around the world and compare them to generalizations of
those situations in the past that subsequently became violent conflicts.  If it finds an
17
approximate match, the system must generate an alert with a probability assessment that such a
situation will become a violent conflict given past occurrences.  Doing this requires the CAS to
put the incoming and database information into a form that allows comparison with past cases
and then make the comparison.15
This mechanism must operate in both automatic and manual modes.  That is, given a “list” of
what to look for, the program should periodically (daily if the database is updated that
frequently) and on its own search for items on the list.  In the manual mode a user should be
able to expand or focus the search criteria to follow a particular lead or hunch, or the user
should be able to improve the automatic mechanism by redefining its search list, in a sense
"teaching" the mechanism how to do a better job of finding the crucial situations which merit
attention.
It must be kept in mind that a CAS is not a crystal ball.  It will not spot all potential conflicts,
and it will give false alarms.  Yet, it can help by drawing attention to situations that given past
experience appear to be conflict-prone.  On the other hand, the CAS will be able to "learn"
from its alerts (both successes and failures) and thus become more accurate as time progresses
and the variety of its “experiences” accumulates.
EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS IN AN ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK
Conflict alert systems will be situated within an organizational setting.  An institution that opts
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to do conflict early warning as described above will probably create an early warning group or
early warning office.  This group, which should consist of six to ten individuals for world-wide
coverage, can reside in a number of locations.  At one extreme an early warning group could
be an independent entity within the organization (such as the United Nations or the US State
Department) and could provide information to all components of the organizaton.  At the other
extreme it could be a component of an existing office or department.  For example, a bureau
that focuses on a particular region might employ an early warning group while another bureau
that concentrates on a different region might choose to not create such a group.
The location could be functionally focused.  For instance, an office that deals with
humanitarian relief activities might choose to house an early warning group while an office
that concentrates on peacemaking activities might not.  Naturally, there are trade-offs between
the alternatives.  An independent group can easily provide information to all other components
of the larger organization.  Unfortunately, it might be ignored by most, if not all, because it is
not affiliated with them.  Conversely, a group residing within a larger bureau might be taken
seriously by those in that bureau, but it may be stymied in providing information to others
outside of it because of bureaucratic “turf wars.”
Another possibility is to locate a conflict alert system within a new office whose function is to
try prevent the outbreak of violent conflict.16  These organizations have been referred to as War
Risk Reduction Centers and Conflict Prevention Centers.17  They all share two missions:
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1. Acquire, assemble, and report information about potential conflicts or other threats to
peace to their parent organizations (such as the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe or the United Nations).
2. Support efforts by the parent organizations to avert the threats to peace.
Both regional and global versions of these centers have been proposed, and one regional
example now exists.  The Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna began operating in 1991 with
some of the features proposed for this type of center.18  An early warning capability is
necessary for conflict prevention centers to play their envisioned anticipatory, preventative
role.  Unfortunately, the Conflict Prevention Center does not possess a unit capable of
performing early warning at this time.  The Office for Research and the Collection of
Information (ORCI) at the United Nations, which was founded in 1987, was intended to
provide early warning and information support at the UN19 and may have evolved into a global
conflict prevention center.  ORCI was eliminated during a reorganization in 1993, but its
functions have continued in other locations within the UN such as the Department of
Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) and the Department of Political Affairs. The Humanitarian
[Relief] Early Warning System (HEWS) at the Department of Humanitarian Affairs is a
prototype CAS that will hopefully receive additional development support.  At this point in
time, one cannot say that conflict early warning and conflict prevention are thriving activities.
There are many reasons why conflict prevention and conflict early warning have not moved
into a normal and expected role within organizations.20  The largest roadblock is, of course, the
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reluctance of individuals and organizations to get involved in peacemaking.  Do we set
dangerous precedents by usurping state sovereignty?  Do we even know what to do?  Can we
make a difference?  Do we really care what happens?  This paper does not have answers to
these questions, but it is fair to say that with respect to the second and third questions, research
has been done and is being continued to find answers.21  With respect to the first and fourth
questions, they are primarily philosophical, but if one accepts a Rawlsian perspective, there
exist good reasons for attempting conflict prevention.22
Whether conflict prevention centers will be established or not, and if so, what form they will
take will depend primarily on the degree to which the international community wishes and
decides to have multilateral conflict management and the range of behaviors (cross-border
wars, civil wars, government-sponsored violence against social groups) over which it will
allow that management.  A second major determinant will be the extent to which conflict
prevention is valued as a component of conflict management.  If a conflict prevention center is
established, it would be a natural home for an early warning group.  The existence of
functioning conflict alert systems will, conversely, increase the viability of conflict prevention
and the establishment of conflict prevention centers.
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL CONFLICT EARLY WARNING
SYSTEMS
Absolutely essential for getting an early warning capability to help conflict prevention is the
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following:  Senior leadership at the organizations attempting preventive diplomacy (such as the
UN or OSCE) must demand from their staffs that they get a useable early warning of violent
conflicts.  Nothing short of this will motivate the staffs to do the best job they can to develop
an effective CAS and efficient channels for information transfer up through the organization. 
An attitude of “It would be nice to have early warning” will not lead to sufficient energy,
attention, and resources being allocated to early warning.  This can be made very concrete by
linking promotions and salary increases for individuals in the chain of command from the
leadership to the early warning group to their effectiveness in providing conflict alerts with
very few false alarms.
Earlier the point was made that the ability to provide a probability assessment of a conflict alert
was a necessary feature of a CAS.  There, unfortunately, is a problem with this capability.  We
face an unavoidable problem in that decision makers hate probabilistic assessments that
something will happen because it places them in the situation that they may suffer the
ignominy or worse of making the wrong choice.  For this reason many decision makers may be
very reluctant to have an conflict alert system that can put them in such a situation.  There is no
easy answer for this problem.  To overcome it we need to make sure that a system is well-
grounded and developed before it is put into operation.  To achieve this a system would need to
be brought “on-line” at first only in a test mode so that there are not unrealistic expectations.
As stated earlier, an effective early warning system will operate on the basis of a large number
of varied information sources.  These should range from fast-paced, timely news sources such
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as the press services (AFP, AP, MENA, Reuters, Hsinhua, CNN, etc.) to intermittent or
sporadic sources such as books, journal articles or eyewitness accounts.  One can expect that
the press services will tend to provide the "catalysts" to the CAS whereas the other sources will
supply much of the background, contextual information that determines whether a particular
event or action is a likely harbinger to a conflict or refugee flow (i.e. be a "catalyst").
As much as possible, a CAS should take advantage of local sources such as local newspapers,
and, if possible, reports from individuals working or living in potential hotspots.  An example
of these individuals would be workers for humanitarian relief or aid organizations.  These
workers who are “on the ground” can, in principle, provide some of the most relevant early
warning information such as ‘people going to meetings in which a political entrepreneur is
attempting to mobilize them against the government or other groups.  However, it is and will
be exceedingly difficult to access these individuals’ insights because they will lose the
neutrality and trust they need with the different groups in a society, especially if tensions rise. 
As a result, aid workers and the organizations they work for are and will be loathe to share
what they know.  This is a difficult problem that raises questions of the proper role and extent
of intelligence gathering and protecting civil and political rights.
The office or center operating an early warning system will need to subscribe to the press
services and to a wide range of journals and news magazines.  In order to minimize delays,
newspapers, journals, and magazines should be purchased in the country of publication and
then be scanned and faxed or emailed to the early warning office.  Ideally, the United Nations
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offices in each country would perform this task for a UN early warning center.  Unfortunately,
host government sensitivity to "spying" will in most instances prevent this from happening.
Obtaining information pales in difficulty compared with the task of gleaning from the deluge
of data which can now be accessed those nuggets that help in early warning.  A key question is
what should be the extent of "hands-on" human intervention in this process.  If people are to do
essentially all of the work in what is essentially an extension of their current activities, program
managers must know that the work is labor-intensive.  The employment of six to ten full-time-
equivalents (FTE’s) is not an unreasonable estimate for global coverage.  Moreover, these
individuals should possess master's degrees or the equivalent or higher in fields closely related
to international affairs.
If computers are to do the bulk of the work, the center will require advanced, sophisticated
computer software to scan documents for relevant texts, at least one highly-skilled individual
to operate (and perhaps improve the software), and three or four FTE’s to assemble the
documents.  Procuring the scanning software and hardware entails a significant but not
overwhelming expense.
Many feel uneasy about relying solely on computers to identify and pick out the information
that is important or relevant for early warning.  This is a valid concern that should be addressed
by developing and using procedures to ensure that individuals with appropriate expertise make
key decisions about what is relevant and what is not.  In practice this can be done by having a
24
small group of individuals establish and refine the parameters by which certain pieces of
incoming information are included by the computer system while others are discarded.  To do
this the individuals must periodically “sample” the information that goes into the database and
compare it with the incoming information to make sure that the computer system properly
discriminates between pertinent and less essential information.   On the other hand, the
computer system will over time accumulate data about what information is better suited for
conflict early warning, and that “knowledge” needs to be communicated back to the human
users to help them refine their own assessments of what incoming information should be used. 
The best conflict alert systems will employ this kind of back and forth interaction.
If conflict alert systems do become operational and function as designed, one second-order
consequence of that deserves mention.  If people believe that CAS’s work, one should expect
that individuals, organizations, and countries would endeavor to more thoroughly disguise their
intentions and actions in order to "beat" the CAS.  This likelihood makes it imperative that the
CAS be endowed with learning mechanisms so that it becomes more adept in recognizing
patterns that signal intent and thus potential conflict.
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CONCLUSION
Early warning is only one part of conflict prevention.  In turn, conflict prevention is just one
component of the even higher-level issues of collective security and international peacemaking.
Conflict alert systems are like any technology.  They can be either good or bad depending upon
on how they are used and one's perspective on that use.  Let us make certain that early warning
systems are used to help prevent violent conflict, but let us also make sure that they are not
used to stifle political change.  Much work needs to be done in order for us to have operational
early warning systems for conflict prevention.  Even more must be done to ensure that we have
multilateral security organizations that can effectively yet never improperly use those systems.
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